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Software Defined Membrane: 
Policy-Driven Edge and 
Internet of Things Security
he Internet of Things (IoT) is the latest evolution of 
computing technology, incorporating potentially bil-
lions of devices (such as cameras, sensors, RFIDs, 
smart phones, and wearables). It is not owned or coor-
dinated by any central authority, but is a heterogeneous mix of 
devices, components, lightweight OS’s, technologies, and pro-
tocols, from different organizations and by individuals deploy-
ing and using them for their own purposes. There are currently 
6.4 billion IoT devices in use around the world (according to 
Gartner). Their number, capabilities, and scope of use keep 
growing and changing rapidly. Gartner also forecasts that the 
number of IoT devices will reach 20.8 billion by 2020, and 
that IoT service spending will reach $1,534 billion, and hard-
ware spending $1,477 billion by this period. Similarly, the vol-
ume of generated data and computing/storage requirements 
of IoT applications will continue to increase. However, secu-
rity and data privacy remain major challenges in the use of 
such IoT devices in a complex environment. We illustrate that 
software-defined membrane can agilely integrate security policies that enables 
resilient and dependable migration of microservices/data among Edge and 
Cloud resources. IoT technologies are introducing many billions of Internet 
Connected ‘Devices’ or ‘Things’ where programmability remains a major fea-
ture. Vendors are increasingly providing additional features into their devices 
without fully realizing the potential security implications that such features 
introduce. Edge devices (sensors, actuators, mobile phones, surveillance 
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cameras, routers, gateways, and switches) ubiquitously monitor the cyber and 
physical worlds. Similarly, IoT devices provide unprecedented ability to collect 
data, but also necessitate timely processing of the data collected. This requires 
intelligent approaches to reduce the network latency as well as the cost of pro-
cessing. Designing security measures for IoT is particularly challenging due 
to the heterogeneity (types, data formats, firmware, etc.) of devices, leading 
to potentially a range of attack vectors that are not relevant for other types 
of computing infrastructure.1 Some refer to the increasing take-up of such 
devices as leading to an “untrusted internet”. Recently, various reports have 
emerged of insecure IoT and Edge device deployments inadvertently exposing 
personal or corporate data. However, the introduction of additional capability 
at the network Edge creates both security challenges and opportunities. One 
issue that has been highlighted in the recent past is whether microservices 
deployed on Edge devices are more secure than those deployed on remote 
Cloud-based data centers. For example, a malicious attacker able to replace a 
microservice could compromise the subsequent processing of sensor data and 
any decisions that are reached on such data. On the other hand, new oppor-
tunities with Edge computing include the ability to aggregate and anonymize 
data close to sensors to thwart an attack in the remote data center, or in the 
network link connecting the Edge and the Cloud.
The Osmotic Computing Paradigm  
and MicroELements
To foster integration of Edge computing and Cloud 
computing data centers, in a previous Blue Skies 
column we proposed the “Osmotic Computing” 
paradigm (hereby referred to as OSMOSIS) that 
focuses on techniques and mechanisms to expand 
IoT capabilities exploiting Edge and Cloud resources 
by identifying, designing, and implementing a new 
computing model.2 The benefits of integrating differ-
ent computing paradigms in this way, such as Edge 
and Cloud computing, have already been acknowl-
edged by both academic and industry-based initia-
tives, including Cisco, Amazon Web Services (e.g., 
Snowball Edge and Greengrass), and the Open Fog 
Consortium. Overall, IoT applications and services 
deployed in an OSMOSIS system can be viewed as a 
graph of MicroELements (MELs), where a MEL can 
be composed of two types of software components: 
1) MicroServices, that implement specific func-
tionalities and which can be deployed and migrated 
across different virtualized infrastructures, and 
2) MicroData, that represents a piece of information 
flowing from and to IoT sensor and actuator devices, 
and which may occur in a variety of domain-specific 
data formats.3 OSMOSIS goes beyond simple elastic 
management of deployed MELs since deployment 
and migration strategies are related to require-
ments of both infrastructure (e.g., load balancing, 
reliability, availability) and applications (e.g., sens-
ing/actuation capabilities, context awareness, prox-
imity, quality of service (QoS), security, privacy), 
can change over time, and have specific security 
requirements.
In contrast to existing academic and industry-
based initiatives in IoT and Edge computing, OSMO-
SIS focuses specifically on enabling the dynamic 
management of composed MELs across IoT devices, 
Edge devices and micro-data centers, and Cloud data 
centers. To overcome IoT resource heterogeneity, the 
MEL abstraction enables us to support a virtual envi-
ronment that can be adapted based on the underlying 
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infrastructure and/or IoT devices. Based on particu-
lar performance triggers (e.g., latency, response time, 
battery usage) and data flow policies (e.g., security 
and privacy aspects) MELs can migrate from IoT or 
Edge devices to one or more Cloud data center (and 
vice versa). For example,
• Mapping a MEL that analyses sensitive sen-
sor data to the nearby IoT gateway in the Edge 
micro-data center may reduce security risks and 
data transfer network latency but it could lead to 
slower data processing due to inferior hardware 
features of gateway as compared to Cloud data 
center hosted servers.
• On the other hand, encrypting and anonymiz-
ing sensitive data on IoT devices may thwart a 
security attack while data is being transferred to 
the MEL hosted at a nearby IoT gateway and/
or remote data center for processing. However, 
this could lead to the draining of battery power 
for the resource-constrained IoT sensor and/or 
gateway.
Figure 1 shows MELs at different layers. MELs at 
layer L2 are deployed in multiple embedded devices 
(e.g., IoT gateways such as Raspberry Pi) at the net-
work edge. Gateway nodes undertake operations 
(average, min, max, filtering, aggregation, etc.) on 
data streaming from L3. Often, they capture data 
with predefined frequency (e.g., dictated by the rate 
of change of the observed phenomenon), depending 
on the device capacity to record/collect data and also 
based on specific system requirements that must be 
satisfied. Conversely, they might process distributed 
queries or commands received from either layer L3 
or layer L1, returning a response or command to the 
same or a different layer. It should be clear that this 
is a simplified abstraction for purposes of exposition: 
some geographical, organizational, architectural, 
or jurisdictional areas might have only two layers, 
whereas others might have multiple intermediate 
layers. Layer L1 might not be a single Cloud data 
center, but multiple regions and availability zones, 
multiple Clouds, a hybrid Cloud, a Multicloud, mul-
tiple Clouds with an intermediate market, broker, or 
exchange or combinations of these.4
At layer L1, more complex computational and 
storage capability is made available to MELs, 
enabling more specialized (for example quantum, 
HPC, AI, etc.) and/or complex, generally long 
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FIGURE 1. Components in OSMOSIS and the MEL abstraction.
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running simulations and/or analytics to be car-
ried out on the data. Each infrastructure type (IoT, 
Edge, and Cloud) also has its own objective func-
tion, influencing the types of operations carried out. 
For instance, Edge (L2) generally consist of resource 
constrained devices (limited battery power, network 
range, etc.); operations must be performed in the 
context of these constraints. Hence, storage and 
computer capacity at the Edge must be shared across 
multiple concurrent data flows (possibly from L3), so 
analysis is limited by the number of flows and time 
constraints in carrying out the filtering/pre-analysis. 
Operations in Cloud (L1) are based on pre-agreed 
targets between a client and a data center provider, 
e.g., throughput, response time, cost. Understand-
ing how an application hosted on a Cloud at L1 can 
interact and coordinate with IoT (L3) and Edge (L2) 
is a key research challenge, particularly for real time, 
streaming applications. Driven by QoS, sensing, 
actuating (L3), and security/privacy requirements 
the MEL can be distributed across Cloud, Edge, and 
IoT. Distributing analysis of data across these dif-
ferent infrastructures can improve overall IoT appli-
cation performance and reduce core network load. 
OSMOSIS suggests that a MEL is not confined to 
a specific type of infrastructure (or location); the 
same MEL can be realized across various different 
resources types with varying levels of complexity.
At layer L3, IoT devices communicate based 
on standardized protocols such as the Constrained 
Application Protocol (CoAP), supported through 
Erbium REST interface and specialist operating 
systems such as Contiki and RiotOS, and network 
functions as Open Virtual Network (OVN). A net-
work virtualization abstraction, such an OVN (an 
open source framework originally launched by the 
Open vSwitch team at Nicira (now part of VMware)) 
can be usefully adopted to support MEL interaction 
over a network and device-centric, data-centric, and 
network-centric security.
OSMOSIS enables management of deployed 
MELs in response to QoS, security/privacy require-
ments, and run-time perturbations (see Figure 1). 
This approach decouples IoT application deployment 
from infrastructure management, and makes it pos-
sible for MELs to migrate from Cloud to the Edge 
and/or IoT devices and vice versa. For instance, 
consider a situation where several IoT devices are 
collecting large volumes of data at L3. Consider also 
that, given the network stability and capacity, the 
amount of data produced and its subsequent trans-
mission to a Cloud data center (L1) are unsustain-
able from a networking point of view. Analizying 
this data in the Cloud would become unfeasible, 
resulting in the current system not being able to con-
tinue functioning. Using the OSMOSIS approach, 
upon detecting such a bottleneck, the OSMOSIS 
approach shifts processing of some of the data to the 
Edge (L2).
Case for OSMOSIS Security Membrane
Borrowing from the chemistry analogy (which is the 
motivation behind OSMOSIS), a membrane regu-
lates the flow of molecules across the membrane in 
solutions with different solute concentrations. In 
OSMOSIS, the “membrane” concept strictly relates 
to the control of MEL flows in the whole system, 
hence allowing us to manage security and privacy 
issues. A membrane enables grouping and filtering 
of MELs based on their properties and use. Mem-
branes among different sub-systems allow MELs 
to migrate, subject to constraints identified in the 
membrane, guaranteeing isolation of one system 
from another. This isolation can be seen as a secu-
rity mechanism, limiting the impact of particular 
violations on sub-parts of the overall system being 
managed.
The Software Defined Membrane (SDMem) in 
our OSMOSIS architecture acts as a filter to limit 
how MELs can be migrated, and under which con-
text. We propose realizing security and privacy 
mechanisms for supporting the seamless flow of 
MELs in OSMOSIS, contextualized as the realiza-
tion of a “Security SDMem”. Security in OSMOSIS 
involves two aspects: i) design and specification of 
MEL; ii) migration and management of MEL, sub-
ject to security and privacy policies.
The Attacker Security Model
Attacker Security Model involves developing poten-
tial attack scenarios to protect against particular 
types of security violations and vulnerabilities, 
thereby leading to consideration of mitigation strat-
egies to prevent/minimize disruption due to such 
attacks. Hardware-based secure cryptographic 
approaches can also be made use of Edge (L2) and 
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IoT (L3) devices to support such mitigation strat-
egies, where these are available. However, such 
approaches could incur additional performance 
overheads if implemented. The attack scenarios we 
consider can be either device or network-centric, 
and may target the scarcity of IoT resources (e.g., 
CPU, memory, battery) or the difficulty of updating 
their firmware with security patches, which typically 
leads to inadequate security. In the wider context, it 
is also necessary to consider attacks due to human 
error or intervention. We consider the following 
types of attacks:
• Device-centric attacks (requiring physical 
access to the device): reverse engineer firmware 
to recover passwords and unencrypted sensitive 
data. Creating a “side channel” to access sensi-
tive data held on the resource, without knowl-
edge of device owner;
• Network-centric attacks (possible with just 
remote access): i) rogue devices in the local net-
work: sniffing, Man-in-the-Middle attack, SSL-
strip for TLS interception, delete/replace/inject 
data in the connection between the IoT device 
and Cloud, aiming to disrupt the data transfer 
protocol; ii) remote attack: unsanitized data 
injection into the device aiming to penetrate the 
device, fuzzing attack; iii) availability attack: 
denial of service attack, sleep deprivation 
attack; iv) attack towards Cloud/IoT: spoofing 
the identity of one to the other; v) Combinations 
of the above attacks in attack trees. The over-
all objective is to consider issues around: break-
ing Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and 
Authentication. We summarize the attack types 
from [2,5,6,7] by their model, risks, attacks, and 
targets in Table 1.
Software Defined Membrane (SDMem)  
for Security Management
The Attacker Security Model discussed above can 
be used to specify how security policies can be used 
to support SDMem. In Figure 2, three SDMems 
(A, B, and C) are defined, corresponding to differ-
ent application contexts over shared resources and 
MELs. The SDMem is responsible for creating iso-
lated networks among MELs, based on communi-
cation tunnels. The C SDMem creates an isolated 
context where a Gateway (on the Edge) can commu-
nicate with all the deployed MELs.
Communications use the same Internet I/O pro-
tocols (for example CoAP) and the same security 
Cloud: L1
Big Data Repo
Storage Tank
Micro Cloud
On the Edge Resources: L2
IoT
L3 
Software Defined
MEMbrane (A)
Software Defined
MEMbrane (B)
Software Defined
MEMbrane(C)
Cloud MEL
Edge MEL
IoT MEL Edge MEL
MELS
Solutions
MELS
Solution
s
Inverse
Direct
MS/MD
MD
IoT
L3 
Micro
Cloud 
On the Edge Resources: L2
FIGURE 2. Software-defined Membrane (SDMem) in OSMOSIS.
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capabilities (such as Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES)) encryption on hardware in order to encrypt 
MELS inside the C SDMem.
If the Attacker Security Model highlights a pos-
sible vulnerability (for example in a Smart Factory 
IoT 4.0), each SDMem with specific MELs will rear-
range the virtual system in order to satisfy security 
requirements. The B SDMem should take into con-
sideration any extra needs, e.g. avoiding a Distrib-
uted Denial of Service (DDoS) attack (availability: A 
of CIA). Here, IoT and Cloud resources are respon-
sible for creating the B Membrane to deal with the 
DDoS attack. Example new membranes might be 
created to resetup new communication tunnels. 
From Figure 2, various confidentiality approaches 
can be used. For Membrane C, it is possible to use 
simple Encryption and Hashing Algorithms (such as 
ECC, AES, SHA-256, and so on) whereas in Mem-
brane B the use of Homomorphic Algorithms may 
be used. We therefore identify Encryption modules 
to support this. In this way, OSMOSIS allows pro-
viders to easily customize a proper security level.
Future efforts to be considered in context of 
SDMem should focus on the following perspectives: 
first, MEL design has to follow the security patterns 
that can guarantee a high degree of resiliency while 
MELs are executed and/or migrated across heteroge-
neous infrastructure (IoT, Edge, Cloud), along with 
the needs to secure APIs. Second, new networking 
abstractions, such as Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV) and Service Function Chaining can be 
exploited to develop end-to-end secure communica-
tion tunnels and novel packet-level analysis tech-
niques. Third, developing a secure API for remote 
orchestration of heterogeneous Edge and IoT devices 
exploiting Software Defined Networking and NFV 
capabilities would provide a useful research chal-
lenge. While doing so, the research efforts also need 
to cater for relative lack of resources (CPU, mem-
ory, battery) at IoT and Edge layers and difficulty in 
updating firmware with security patches—typically 
leading to inadequate security.
Related Work on IOT Security
IoT security is becoming increasingly important due 
to the deployment of a huge number of IoT devices 
(sensors and actuators) across various sectors, includ-
ing Industry 4.0, Smart Cities, Healthcare, Homes, 
Buildings, and Smart Cars. The survey describes 
many existing IoT protocols and presents open 
research issues, specifically in the area of security.5 
The authors highlight key security requirements as 
privacy, anonymity, liability and trust, which will 
be fundamental for social acceptance of future IoT 
applications employing Internet integrated sensing 
devices. Internet-originated attacks such as Denial of 
TABLE 1. Attack Types.1,7–9
Attacker  
Security Model Risks Attacks Targets
Device Data Leakage Data Sniffing and 
Man-in-the-Middle
Transmitted data
Device Spoofing/Identity 
Modification. This 
could also be Selective 
Forwarding of data
Sybil Attack Insertion of inaccurate data; 
masquerading as another 
device
Device Energy/Resource Bleeding Barrage and Deprivation of 
Sleep State
System operation and 
battery
Device & 
Network
Service Disruption Denial of Service System availability and 
reachability
Network Network Function 
Disruption
TCP SYN flood and/or ACK 
spoofing
Data transmission
Network Smurf attack Internet Control Message 
Protocol and Broadcast
Data transmission
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Service (DoS) are a challenge to solve, and availability 
and resilience are also relevant requirements to con-
sider. Mechanisms will also be required to implement 
protection against threats to the normal functioning 
of IoT communication protocols, an example of which 
may be fragmentation attacks that the 6LoWPAN 
adaptation layer suffers. Finally, security mechanisms 
designed to protect communications using the main 
IoT protocols must provide appropriate assurances in 
terms of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and 
non-repudiation of the information flows. Indeed, 
security of IoT communications may be addressed 
in the context of the communication protocol itself. 
In this domain, other work includes securing IoT 
communications, as well as the Lightweight Privacy-
Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Fog Com-
puting-Enhanced IoT that uses the homomorphic 
Paillier encryption, Chinese Remainder Theorem, 
and one-way hash chain techniques.6
Conclusion
We describe the integration of security strategy as 
a programmatic “Security Software Defined Mem-
brane”, to enable optimal migration of microservices 
and their data (referred to as MELs), between Edge 
and Cloud resources. The SDMem is configured 
based on a security policy informed by an “attacker 
model”—this involves a user or security analyst 
specifying potential attack types and resources that 
will be impacted. In this work, we focus on security 
concerns rooted in devices and the network between 
them. The approach advocated here can be adapted 
based on changes in the type of Edge and/or IoT 
device being considered. 
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